Why are heterogenous communities inefficient? Theory, history and an experiment by Hugh-Jones, David & Perroni, Carlo
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2570940 
Why are heterogenous communities inefficient?
Theory, history and an experiment ⇤ ,†
David Hugh-Jones
University of East Anglia
Carlo Perroni
University of Warwick and CAGE
26th February 2015
Abstract
We examine why heterogenous communities may fail to provide public goods. Current
work characterizes sanctioning free-riders as an under-supplied public good. We argue that
often free-riders can be punished by the coordinated action of a group. This punishment can
be profitable, and need not be undersupplied. But the power to expropriate defectors can
also be used to expropriate outgroups. Heterogenous societies may be inefficient because
minorities, rather than free-riders, are expropriated. Even if this is not so, groups’ different
beliefs about the reasons for expropriation may make the threat of punishment less effective at
preventing free-riding. We illustrate our theory with evidence from California mining camps,
contemporary India, and US schools. In a public goods experiment using minimal groups and
a profitable punishment institution, outgroups were more likely to be punished, and reacted
differently to punishment than ingroup members.
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1 Introduction
Ethnically diverse communities appear to be less successful at providing public goods (Alesina,
Baqir and Easterly, 1999, Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000, Easterly 2001b). It is important to
understand why, since many societies have increasing levels of ethnic diversity. Existing work
suggests that in these societies, sanctioning free-riders is harder, and therefore more free-riding
takes place. Proposed mechanisms include differing expectations of being sanctioned, and a
social network structure that makes it harder to identify and punish free-riders from out-groups
(Miguel and Gugerty, 2005; Habyarimana et al., 2007; Habyarimana, Humphreys and Posner,
2009).
This paper proposes a new mechanism to explain the phenomenon. In diverse societies, col-
lective sanctioning easily shades into expropriation of vulnerable minorities. This makes it less
effective and more dangerous. It is less effective because targeting minorities redirects coercive
power away from the enforcement of cooperation; also, even the perception of ethnic bias in
sanctioning weakens both the sanction’s deterrent power and its legitimacy. It is more dangerous
because misperceived sanctions may lead to counter-mobilization by the minority, and to ethnic
conflict. Below (in Section 2) we give several examples, but the following dialogue between a
white teacher and a black student illustrates our basic mechanism.
Teacher: (to student): Please sit down and stop talking.
Student: I was only seeing if I could borrow a pencil and a piece of paper for that
quiz you were talking about.
Teacher: You know you’re supposed to be in your seat.
Student: But you’ll give me a zero if I don’t have a quiz paper.
Teacher: (slightly exasperated): Sit down. You’re supposed to bring those things to
class or to borrow them before class.
Student: (voice rising): Why you picking on me? You don’t pick on white kids who
borrow a piece of paper.
(Grant, 1988; emphasis added.)
In this episode, conflict arises from a difference in beliefs about an unobservable counterfactual:
would the teacher act the same if the student were white? We conjecture that situations like this
are widespread.
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Our argument is based on a new analysis of the problem of collective action. The standard
view is that the key problem for social groups is to prevent individual free-riding, which can be
done by sanctioning free-riders; because sanctioning free-riders is costly to the sanctioner but
benefits the community as a whole, enforcement is itself a public good. This is known as the
“second-order collective action problem”.1
We start from the observation that while the setup costs of institutions to monitor free-riding
must be borne by the community, punishing free-riders need not itself be costly.2 For, a credi-
ble threat of punishment can be converted to a transfer from the guilty party which benefits the
punisher; and, when enough people coordinate to punish somebody, they run few risks and may
benefit materially by expropriating the person.3 In these cases, punishment is individually ra-
tional for the punishers and the threat of punishment is credible. Then, sanctioning free-riders
is simply a coordination problem: the threat of expropriation of defectors is credible (as coor-
dinated expropriation is gainful), and can act as a deterrent if defection triggers a switch from
non-expropriation to coordinated expropriation – both of which are equilibrium outcomes of the
ensuing coordination game. Indeed, a recent review of the anthropological literature shows that
much free-riding is punished costlessly (Guala, 2012; see also Boehm, 2001).
The ease of punishment by groups, however, can itself create inefficiencies. Majorities may
target individuals inappropriately, falsely identifying unusual, unpopular or vulnerable people as
free-riders. This has happened across many social settings and historical periods.4 Furthermore,
the real or perceived threat of expropriation by a majority can make individuals unwilling to
1Ostrom (1990) describes the “general problem” of common pool resource situations as “how to organize to
avoid the adverse outcomes of independent action [our italics]” (p. 29) and argues “[s]ubstantial benefits have
to be obtained to make costly monitoring and sanctioning activities worthwhile” (p. 36). See also Frohlich and
Oppenheimer (1970); Oliver (1980); Yamagishi (1986).
2Recent critiques of the importance of costly punishment have focused on the evolutionary difficulty of sustaining
costly punishment motivations, and the inefficiency of costly punishment institutions in laboratory games (Dreber
et al., 2008). We agree, but would add that punishment need not be costly, and that the most powerful forms of
punishment (those administered by groups) will typically be gainful to the punishers. Also, the costly punishment
behavior observed in laboratory experiments, where it may be the only punishment option available, may be a carry-
over from habits formed in real-world settings where punishment is not costly.
3Lanchester’s (1916) “square law” for physical conflict between an individual and a group states that the expected
total harm to group members decreases with the group’s size, and the expected harm to the individual increases with
the group’s size. This is also consistent with theoretical predictions in e.g. trade wars, where larger countries or a
large coalition of small countries can experience a net gain from retaliation against a small country.
4Examples include English popular culture (Thompson, 1992), witchcraft accusations in Europe, Africa and
America (Horsley, 1979; Evans-Pritchard and Gillies, 1976; Boyer and Nissenbaum, 1974), and anti-semitism.
3
take risks or stand out, for example by individual enterprise (Platteau, 1996). Thus, although
individual free-riding may arise due to failure to coordinate on punishment, societies also face
the problem of expropriation by majorities causing deadweight losses and weakening individual
incentives. A society’s ability to provide public goods – its “state capacity” – ultimately hinges
on its ability to harness the coercive power of groups and ensure that this is directed towards
defectors.5 By focussing on individual free-riding to the exclusion of collective expropriation,
social scientists may have misread the problems of self-governing communities.
The problems of collective expropriation are particularly severe in ethnically diverse commu-
nities. Ethnic markers provide a natural coordination device for picking a target. Furthermore,
ethnicity has the advantage for expropriators that it limits the targeted group to a known set of
individuals. As Pastor Niemoller famously pointed out, those who fail to protect the vulnerable
from oppression risk becoming victims themselves next time; this risk may discourage arbitrary
expropriation. But the risk is minimised when victimizers are always from one ethnic group and
victims from another.
Even without actual expropriation of minorities, ethnic diversity can cause inefficiencies: if
minority markers act as salient labels for coordinated expropriation, or are perceived to do so by
minorities, then group expropriation loses its power to deter defection. As the dialogue quoted
earlier suggests, minority targets of sanctioning face a difficult problem of causal identification:
are they targeted for breaking the rules, or because of their identity? Not surprisingly, different
communities often disagree radically about the interpretation of particular events. In turn, pun-
ishees who believe that they are being targeted unfairly will perceive few incentives, material
or moral, not to free-ride. Minority communities may even counter-mobilize in response to the
targeting. These possibilities make cross-ethnic punishment of free-riders more risky and less
effective. In settings where a small disagreement can spark a riot, the price of ethnic peace is
tolerating bad behavior. It is therefore natural that, as previous work has found, technologies of
community punishment remain bounded by ethnicity.
Some ingredients of our argument are echoed in the existing literature on community sanc-
tioning. The successful CPR systems analysed in Governing The Commons (Ostrom, 1990) often
involved fines and redistribution of “ill-gotten gains” as sanctions; Weissing and Ostrom (1991)
5There is a small but growing literature on the determinants of state capacity (Besley and Persson, 2010, 2009),
but this abstracts from the question of how enforcement can be sustained in groups in the absence of a binding social
contract, and thus neglects the mechanisms we highlight here.
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examine a game in which individuals monitor each other for rule violations, and receive rewards
when they observe them. Other authors have examined group coordination as a means of punish-
ing free-riders. Weingast (1997) models how citizens can coordinate to preserve the rule of law
against infringements by rulers. Experiments on coordinated punishment in the context of public
goods games include Casari and Luini (2009). Recent work on “mobbing” shows that majori-
ties are willing and able to coordinate on vulnerable individuals (Abbink and Dog˘an, N.d.). Our
experiment below allows “mobbing” to punish free-riders.
Some experimental work has examined public good provision in different societies. Habyari-
mana et al. (2007; 2009) conduct experiments in a Ugandan slum, examining the causal mecha-
nism behind diversity’s effect on public good provision. They classify possible mechanisms into
preference, technology and strategy selection mechanisms, and argue that network links between
coethnics facilitate punishing defectors. Herrmann, Thöni and Gächter (2008) show that in public
goods games with punishment, societies with weak norms of participation have more “antisocial
punishment”, i.e. punishment of those who contribute to the public good.
Finally, there is a large literature on violent ethnic conflict (Horowitz, 1985, 2001; Posen
1993; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Caselli and Coleman, 2006; Esteban and Ray, 2008). However,
few papers draw the link between non-violent, peacetime inefficiency and the shadow of con-
flict. Below, we discuss how different groups may come into conflict as each group expropriates
individuals from the other.
We stress three key empirical implications of our theory. First, the problems of ethnically
divided societies are often thought to lie in deep cultural differences. However, even when there
is a strong shared culture, or where different cultural norms are mutually well-understood, the
mere fact of visible difference may be enough to make one group a potential target. For example,
in Bosnia, Muslims, Serbs and Croats lived in mixed villages and, while maintaining cultural
differences, also shared identities as villagers, and were knowledgeable about each others’ cus-
toms (Bringa, 1993); yet, during the Yugoslav conflict, different identities swiftly became a basis
for conflict. Second, the central mechanism making heterogenous communities less efficient is
the threat and reality of coordinated expropriation. If so, then removing the possibility of ex-
propriation should remove the difference. Third, part of this mechanism is factual and normative
ambiguity. Where free-riding is easily observable and clearly defined, minority free-riders are un-
likely to feel unfairly victimized if they are targeted, but as the scope for different interpretations
increases, the problems are likely to grow.
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We use a laboratory experiment to test these three implications. We implement heterogeneity
in a “minimal” way, as a publicly visible label. We vary the availability of coordinated punish-
ment. Additional treatments vary the ambiguity of the situation. Before describing our experi-
ment, we develop our argument in a series of examples.
2 Informal enforcement and ethnic heterogeneity
2.1 Diversity, expropriation and conflict in California mining camps
In 1849, shortly after California was ceded to the United States, gold was discovered in the
territory. The legal status of gold claims remained unclear until 1866. Furthermore, state authority
was distant or absent in the California territory: there was no police force, and in the first years
even the identity of the legal authorities was unclear. As a result, miners had to make and enforce
their own rules.
As early histories of the gold rush emphasized, they did so successfully. American miners,
with experience of United States institutions like the town meeting, set up “miners’ meetings” to
allocate property rights and make other rules. The camps were not a Hobbesian war of all against
all, but an ordered anarchy (Umbeck, 1977). Property rights – “claims” to a particular area –
were enforced by the majority. A miner who violated others’ claims could expect to have his own
claim considered nonexclusive and open to jumpers, in an example of punishment as profitable
expropriation. Other crimes were also collectively punished by the population after short and
informal trials (Howe, 1923).
Not all camps were equal, though. Stewart (2009) gathers evidence on twenty-five early
mining camps, and shows that ethnically homogenous camps were more likely to be successful
at enforcing property rights. His explanation is that members of different ethnic groups were
less willing to cooperate, due to different norms and lower altruism towards outgroup members,
or less able to cooperate and coordinate, due to cultural and linguistic differences. This is the
standard explanation described above. However, more recent historical work suggests a further
reason. There was a dark side to mining camp law. Since rule violators could have their own
claims expropriated, groups of miners faced a temptation to find others guilty of violations. Thus,
punishment of rule-breakers shaded into arbitrary expropriation. Non-Anglo-Americans were
particularly often targets: “[t]he French, the Spanish Americans, and the Chinese each tended
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to be separate elements in the population.... from an early date the majority displayed toward
these nationalities a persistent antagonism that was easily triggered into bullying, persecution
and ostracism” (Paul, 1980). A classic example is the “Chilean war” of 1849:
Anglos had begun mining some dry diggings that Chileans had worked earlier,
and when the latter returned for the winter the two groups soon were at odds. In a
called meeting the Anglos formed a mining district and drafted regulations, beginning
with “No foreigners shall be permitted to work at these mines.”... (Paul 1980, p. 241).
Ramon Gil Navarro, an Argentinian miner, described the affair: “Twenty-two Americans came
over to the camp of the Chileans and had coffee with them.... While they were doing this, they
went about taking the weapons of the Chileans without their noticing.... They were all taken to the
house of the judge, who extorted 150 ounces of gold from them.” Later there was a pitched bat-
tle between Chileans and Anglo-Americans; Chileans were arrested and brought before a judge,
three were hanged and others possibly had their ears cut off. Each of these sides had their own
“judge” to legitimize their actions (Navarro, 2000). The failure of ethnically diverse mining
camps was thus due not only to individual free-riding, but also to rampant expropriation of mi-
nority group members by the majority.
Why should ethnic minorities in particular be targeted? Coethnics’ greater ability to coordi-
nate, or their in-group loyalty and outgroup dislike, are possible reasons. Another is to do with
dynamics. If a coalition tries to target another person in the group for expropriation, then other
group members, including members of the coalition, may fear that if the attempt succeeds, they
will be next in line. This reduces the willingness of coalition members to take part in the first
place, and increases the willingness of others to defend the target. However, when the target is in
a clearly defined minority group, then future expropriation attempts may be expected also to fall
on that group. In other words, group membership provides a coordination device which safely
separates persecutors from victims.
2.2 Ambiguity, conflict and sanctioning in India
When punishment shades into expropriation, ethnic divisions cause a further problem. In eth-
nically polarized communities, punishment institutions are plagued by the ambiguity between
targeting a deviator and targeting a minority. Many ethnic riots are sparked by the violation of
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one community’s norms by someone from the other community (Horowitz, 2001). These inci-
dents are commonly seen very differently by different sides.
Brass (1997) describes an incident in 1982 in the Indian town of Daphnala. A father reported
that his daughter had been kidnapped. Three suspects, two Muslims and a Hindu, were arrested,
subsequently released, then rearrested. Locals became convinced that the police were not taking
the investigation seriously and an angry crowd assembled at the police station, led by a prominent
local member of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Brickbats were hurled and a lathi-charge was
made by the police. Later police investigation revealed that the girl was a prostitute and her
“father” was in fact her pimp.
This story was was interpreted differently by different participants. BJP politicians described
the police as protecting Muslim rapists. According to them, both Hindus and Muslims had been
involved in the anti-police disturbance; they describe the protesters as motivated by “civic pride”.
The police, the District Magistrate and Congress politicians saw the disturbance as an attempt to
stir up Hindu-Muslim tensions, with only Hindus involved, motivated by “communal passion”.
In theory this is an empirical matter. In practice, figuring out the truth in such situations can be
very difficult. As Brass puts it, “it is out of such ambiguous materials that mob violence and
Hindu-Muslim riots are created” (see also Brass, 2004). The issue in game-theoretic terms is that
different actors have conflicting beliefs. A crowd’s collective action is a protest against police
injustice; or it is a communal riot. In India, these differing beliefs are encouraged by political
actors with an interest in ethnic tensions. At the same time, each side insists that the other side,
not it, is motivated by communalism.6
There are several possible outcomes. Attempts to sanction minority members can lead to vi-
olent resistance from the minority. Or expropriation may succeed under the guise of punishment.
In some cases, inter-ethnic civic associations may be able to promote peace by scotching rumors,
thus harmonizing different groups’ beliefs (Varshney, 2003). What matters for us is not only the
possibility of ethnic conflict per se, but its effect on peacetime relations. The ambiguity between
punishment and expropriation makes it risky to impose punishment on those from other com-
munities. As a result, sanctions can only be imposed within separate communities. Hence the
commonly-expressed attitude, among ethnic groups at peace, that “we mind our own business”.
6In California mining camps also, the line between punishment and exploitative expropriation was contested by
different groups, who indeed possessed their own sources of legitimacy, the judges.
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2.3 Ambiguity and legitimacy in US schools
Even when the threat of violence is absent, the ambiguity of punishment may cause inefficiency.
If some groups perceive that they are targeted based on their identity and not their actions, this
will have two effects. First, group members have little incentive to behave well, since they believe
targeting cannot be affected by their behavior. Second, they are likely to resent the punishment as
illegitimate and unfair, and this may further increase their willingness to free-ride (Rabin, 1993).
After desegregation in “Hamilton High” , the school described by Grant, 1988, when white
teachers punished black pupils, each side interpreted this differently: the teachers thought that
impartial rules were being fairly applied, while the pupils saw the rules as biased towards white
standards and applied unfairly. This is the context of the dialogue quoted in the introduction. An
anecdote from another school shows how difficult it can be to choose between such interpreta-
tions. A black pupil doesn’t stop talking as she passes the vice-principal on the stairs. He makes
her go back and come up quietly. She does so, but in a slightly mocking way: “there is the barest
hint of parody in her primness, which Russell does not miss”. The encounter ends with her be-
ing sent to the teacher’s office for the day. Would a white child have been perceived or treated
differently? (Ferguson, 2001, cited in Akerlof and Kranton, 2010).
Such differences in perceptions led to problems with discipline:
Some teachers associated black children with classroom disruption. They sent from
the room children who had no conflict at all with other teachers. On the other side,
some black children were particularly sensitive to slights because of their experience
of being criticized for their race. They might take offense at a teacher’s action and
enter into conflict with him when similar white children would not have.
(Metz, 1979)
These differences of perception may be due to in-group biases in information processing (Hilton
and Von Hippel, 1996), but they can also be exacerbated by the uninformativeness of equilibrium
behavior. Two relevant quantities over which beliefs may differ are:
Pr(punished | black, behaves badly) Pr(punished | white, behaves badly) (1)
and
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Pr(punished | black, behaves badly) Pr(punished | black, behaves well) (2)
Whites and/or teachers may believe (1) is zero and (2) is positive: punishment comes from bad
behavior. Black pupils may believe (1) is positive and (2) is zero: one is punished because of
one’s minority status. To estimate these accurately, many episodes of black and white pupils mis-
behaving, and of black pupils behaving well, must be observed. Now suppose, to take an extreme
case, that black pupils believe they will be punished irrespective of their behavior; as a result
they always behave badly. White pupils believe they will only be punished for bad behavior, and
therefore always behave well. It will then be impossible to estimate either of the above quantities,
since one term in each of them is never observed. Both parties have legitimately differing beliefs
about a counterfactual.7 Of course, more realistically there will be varying degrees of misbehav-
ior and punishment, but it is still true that equilibrium behavior can make it hard for involved
actors to reach common beliefs.
Similar patterns arise in other areas. For instance, different ethnic group members often
have different perceptions of police “stop and search” policies. As this example suggests, the
pattern is not limited to community punishment, but may occur when punishment is delegated
to state agents. However, informal community enforcement is particularly likely to suffer from
these problems: norms are often unwritten and ambiguous; there is no due process to provide
assurances of equal treatment; and the coordination problems of decentralized enforcement create
especially strong incentives to target salient minorities.
3 Experiment
The above discussion points to an alternative explanation for the well-known link between het-
erogeneity and failure to provide public goods. This explanation does not invoke different prefer-
ences or norms, in-group bias, or failure to cooperate because of cultural differences. Instead, the
bare presence of visible minorities provides an alternative target for coordinated expropriation;
this creates an ambiguity in the targeting rule; and punishment of out-groups may then lose its
7We are appealing here to an idea of self-confirming equilibrium (Fudenberg and Levine, 1993).
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legitimacy and deterrent power, and potentially cause conflict. Our historical examples showed
these problems. However, it is hard to make clear-cut inferences about causality from obser-
vations in the field. So, we also ran a laboratory experiment, using artificial, minimal groups,
without cultural differences, to reproduce our mechanism in a controlled environment.
3.1 Experimental design
Subjects were randomly allocated into groups of four, and stayed in the same group throughout
the experiment. They played twenty rounds under one of three institutions.
In Treatment P, each round was a standard public goods game. Each player was endowed
with 50 Experimental Currency Units (ECU) and could contribute them to a common fund. Total
contributions were multiplied by 1.4 before being divided equally among the group. Feedback on
individual contributions was given after each round.
In each round of treatment PX, feedback from the public goods game was followed by an
expropriation game. In this game, subjects were endowed with 50 ECU each. Each subject could
target either a single other group member, or nobody. Targeting was costless. If three subjects
targeted the same person, the target lost 50 ECU and the three each gained 15 ECU. After the
game, subjects received feedback on how many people targeted each group member.
In treatment X, each round consisted of only the expropriation game, without the public goods
game. This allows us to examine how coordinated expropriation is affected by the preceding
public goods game.
Player i’s payoff for a given round can be written:
pi = IP(50  pi+ 1.4
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where IP and IX are indicator variables for the presence of the public goods game and the ex-
propriation game; p j is player j’s contribution to the public goods game; and x j is an indicator
variable taking the value 1 if player j was targeted by the three other players, otherwise 0. In
treatment P, the unique equilibrium has zero contributions. In treatments X and PX, there are
many equilibria, some of which support positive contributions in PX. For example, it is an equi-
librium for all group members to contribute 50 (or any other number) and for deviators to be
expropriated.
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The three “institution” treatments varied between sessions. They were crossed with within-
session treatments which manipulated group heterogeneity. Every subject was given a color label,
purple or green, which stayed the same throughout the experiment and was visible to other group
members. Instructions made clear that the label assignment was random. In homogenous treat-
ments, all subjects within a group had the same color. In heterogenous treatments, one subject
within each group had a different label from the other three subjects. We call such subjects mi-
norities and the other subjects the majority. Thus, these treatments introduce a minimal form of
heterogeneity: a public, randomly assigned label.
Table 1 summarizes the treatments. After the experiment finished, subjects answered a short
questionnaire and were paid privately for one randomly chosen round, at a rate of 1 ECU = 10
UK pence, plus a £2.50 showup fee.
Homogenous Heterogeneous
Expropriation game only (X) X-Hom X-Het
Public goods + expropriation game (PX) PX-Hom PX-Het
Public goods game only (P) P-Hom P-Het
Table 1: Treatments
Our first two hypotheses are:
1. Groups which target expropriation on low contributors will achieve higher contribution
levels.
2. In PX-Het, groups will expropriate fewer low contributors than in PX-Hom.
Hypothesis 1 simply tests that participants best respond to the threat of punishment. Hypothesis 2
will hold if expropriators in heterogenous groups coordinate on minority group members, rather
than on the lowest contributor, or if they fail to coordinate at all. If both hypotheses hold, we
expect:
3. Contributions will be higher in PX-Hom than in PX-Het.
We include treatment P to test that our proposed mechanism drives our results. We expect inef-
ficiency to be caused by less effective expropriation. Removing the expropriation stage should
remove any difference between homogenous and heterogenous treatments:
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4. Heterogeneity will not affect contributions in P treatments.
The last hypothesis is motivated by the idea that minorities may interpret being expropriated
differently. If they believe they are likely to be expropriated regardless of their contribution,
they will have less incentive to contribute more. The same effect could occur if they view their
expropriation as unfair and react resentfully.
5. After experiencing expropriation, minorities will increase their contributions less than ma-
jorities.
3.2 Results
Sessions were run at two UK universities from June 2013 to October 2014, using zTree (Fis-
chbacher, 2007). Subjects were invited using the hroot subject pool management software (Bock,
Nicklisch and Baetge, 2012). In total 532 subjects took part in 35 sessions. Sessions lasted about
one hour. Average earnings were £12.85.
Figure 1 shows mean public goods contributions over time in treatments P and PX. There is
a clear difference between P and PX treatments, and a smaller difference between homogenous
and heterogenous treatments.
We first test hypothesis 1 formally. If low contributors were expropriated, then contributions
should increase, as in public goods games with costly punishment (Fehr and Gachter, 2000). In-
deed, mean contributions per group are significantly higher in PX-Het than P-Het (Mann-Whitney
test, p < 0.001) and higher in PX-Hom than P-Hom (p < 0.05). Table 2 regresses groups’ av-
erage contributions on the number of rounds in which a lowest contributor was expropriated.8
Column 1 shows results for all PX groups. The coefficient on number of expropriations is highly
significant. There is potential endogeneity: if lower (higher) average contributions led to more
expropriations, this would probably bias coefficients towards (away from) zero. To mitigate this
problem, we regressed average contributions from rounds 11-20 on total expropriations in rounds
1-10, controlling for average contributions in rounds 1-10 (Early contributions); results are shown
in column 2. The effect of expropriations increases and remains significant. In column 3, we look
at PX-Het groups, and add the number of expropriations of the minority member.9 The coefficient
8Results would be almost unchanged if we used all expropriations.
9This category can overlap with expropriations of a lowest contributor.
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Figure 1: Mean contributions over time by treatment
on this is negative and weakly significant, suggesting that expropriations of minorities decrease,
rather than increase, efficiency.
To examine hypothesis 2, Figure 2 shows the proportion of subjects expropriated per round,
grouped by both contribution and minority status. Expropriation was overwhelmingly targeted
on lowest contributors in all treatments.10 A unique lowest contributor was especially likely
to be expropriated. At group level, there were significantly more expropriations per group in
PX-Hom than in PX-Het (9.62 vs. 6.56, p < 0.05),11 and also more expropriations of a lowest
contributor (Mann-Whitney p< 0.10), confirming hypothesis 2. This difference has two causes.
First, there are significantly more expropriation attempts, i.e. cases where a subject targeted
another subject, in PX-Hom than in PX-Het (Mann-Whitney p < 0.05). Second, PX-Hom had
more successful expropriations per expropriation attempt (Mann-Whitney p< 0.05). Thus, in the
10About 32% of subjects were lowest contributors in a given round (16% unique lowest, 16% non-unique lowest).
If all group members contributed the same amount, we do not classify them as “lowest contributors”.
11There were also significantly more expropriations in PX-Hom than in X-Hom (9.62 vs. 2.67, Mann-Whitney
p< 0.01). No other differences between treatment pairs are significant.
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All PX All PX, rounds 11-20 PX-Het
Intercept 10.41⇤⇤  3.58 15.36⇤⇤
(2.94) (3.37) (3.66)
Exprop. lowest 1.74⇤⇤⇤ 3.65⇤⇤⇤ 1.75⇤⇤
(0.33) (0.49) (0.48)
Early contributions 0.76⇤⇤⇤
(0.16)
Exprop. minority  2.91+
(1.45)
R2 0.48 0.82 0.52
Adj. R2 0.46 0.81 0.44
Num. obs. 32 32 16
⇤⇤⇤p< 0.001, ⇤⇤p< 0.01, ⇤p< 0.05, +p< 0.1
Table 2: OLS regressions of average contributions per group
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Figure 2: Proportion expropriated by minority status and contribution
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PX treatment, homogenous groups seem to have been both more willing to expropriate, and more
likely to coordinate on a particular target. Within PX-Het, minorities were significantly more
likely to be targeted than majorities, but only when they were non-unique lowest contributors.12
Thus, heterogeneous groups appear to have only targeted minorities so as to coordinate on one of
several equal lowest contributors.
We next test for differences in contributions to the public good. Mean contributions are higher
in homogenous than heterogeneous groups, but these differences are not significant (PX treat-
ments: p=0.27, P treatments: p=1). Thus, hypothesis 4 is supported, but hypothesis 3 is not.
Finally, Table 3 shows how individual contribution decisions responded to being expropriated.
In column 1, contribution decisions are regressed on lagged contribution decisions, and lagged
expropriations interacted with minority status. In column 2 the regression is repeated using the
(lagged) number of other group members targeting the subject (Targeters). The idea is that being
targeted by 1 or 2 others increases the perceived risk of future expropriation. Subjects react to be-
ing expropriated, or to being picked by 2 other group members, by increasing their contributions.
There is no evidence for Hypothesis 5, that minorities react differently than majorities to being
expropriated or targeted: all interaction terms are insignificant, although most have the expected
negative sign.
3.3 Additional treatments
Our initial sessions supported only parts of our hypothesized mechanism. Experiment participants
did coordinate on minority group members, but only when they were one of two or more equal
lowest contributors. Minority participants did not react differently to punishment than majorities,
perhaps because they did not face different risks of punishment unless they were equal lowest
contributors. We ran three additional treatments to test the robustness of these results.
All treatments were variations of the PX institution. History treatments consisted of ten
rounds of the expropriation game only, followed by ten rounds of the public goods game plus
expropriation game. We expected that majorities might coordinate on expropriating minorities
in the first ten rounds, as they had in the original X treatments, and that this history might affect
coordination strategies, and minorities’ expectations, in the last ten rounds.
12See the logit regression in the Appendix.
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PX-Het PX-Het
Intercept 2.95⇤⇤⇤ 2.27⇤⇤
(0.83) (0.79)
Lag contrib. 0.84⇤⇤⇤ 0.85⇤⇤⇤
(0.04) (0.04)
Lag expropriated 8.00⇤⇤⇤
(1.58)
Minority 0.34 0.27
(0.26) (0.92)
Minority * lag exprop.  1.48
(2.50)
Targeters=1 0.48
(1.13)
Targeters=2 2.80⇤
(1.13)
Targeters=3 8.51⇤⇤⇤
(1.66)
Minority * Targeters=1 0.82
(1.48)
Minority * Targeters=2  2.68
(2.07)
Minority * Targeters=3  1.37
(2.64)
Num. obs. 1216 1216
R2 0.67 0.67
Adj. R2 0.66 0.67
L.R. 1332.61 1343.71
⇤⇤⇤p< 0.001, ⇤⇤p< 0.01, ⇤p< 0.05. Robust s.e.s clustered by group
Table 3: OLS regressions of individual contributions
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In noise treatments, we added an independent, uniformly distributed shock (-5 to +5) to each
player’s report of other players’ contributions. Thus, different players would see different contri-
butions and might find it harder to coordinate on expropriating free-riders. At the same time, the
noise made it harder to interpret the cause of any player’s expropriation. Our original treatments
had made contribution levels common knowledge. We aimed to mimic some of the real-world sit-
uations described above, where the level of free-riding, and hence the reasons for expropriation,
are uncertain and interpreted differently across groups.
In stranger treatments, subjects were rematched in new groups of 4 between rounds. They
always stayed within the same Heterogenous/Homogenous treatment and kept the same color
label. The rematching approximates the effect of having a larger community where individuals
interact within a larger group. This might make it harder to coordinate on relatively complex
strategies like targeting the lowest contributor, and might therefore make minorities more salient.
Results from these extra treatments were as follows. First, Figure 3 shows expropriation rates
for the heterogenous groups only. As in the main treatments, minorities were significantly more
likely to be expropriated than majorities. In history and stranger treatments, this was true for both
unique and non-unique lowest contributors.13
Second, minorities reacted differently to expropriation than majorities (see Table 4). As in the
main treatments, majority subjects increased their contribution after being targeted by 2 group
members or expropriated by 3 group members. However, minority subjects increased their con-
tributions less, or not at all: the interaction of Targeters with minority status is consistently nega-
tive.
Lastly, as in the main treatments, these differences in behavior did not lead to lower overall
contribution levels in heterogenous treatments (Mann-Whitney tests on group averages: history
p=0.24; noise p=0.52; session-treatment averages in stranger treatment, p= 0.93).
3.4 Discussion
Our results show our proposed mechanisms at work. In our main treatments, minorities were
targeted more for expropriation: groups appeared to use the minority label as a coordination
13See regressions in the Appendix. In the noise treatment, minority unique lowest contributors were not expropri-
ated. This may have happened because the noise made it hard to identify the true lowest contributor; only 3 minority
subjects were ever unique lowest contributors in this treatment.
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Figure 3: Proportion expropriated by minority status and contribution, supplementary Het treat-
ments
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History, rounds 12-20 Noise Stranger
Intercept 2.40⇤ 2.05⇤ 3.38⇤⇤⇤
(1.16) (0.90) (0.83)
Lag contrib. 0.74⇤⇤⇤ 0.80⇤⇤⇤ 0.74⇤⇤⇤
(0.07) (0.09) (0.05)
Targeters=1  0.93 0.32  0.24
(1.07) (0.65) (0.54)
Targeters=2 3.88⇤ 1.74⇤ 1.40
(1.59) (0.81) (1.08)
Targeters=3 12.26⇤⇤⇤ 10.70⇤⇤ 5.41⇤⇤
(3.03) (3.74) (1.77)
Minority 0.87 1.47  0.27
(0.96) (1.05) (0.64)
Minority * Targeters=1  0.01  0.43  1.09
(1.87) (1.58) (0.74)
Minority * Targeters=2  5.61⇤⇤  0.65  1.57
(1.88) (2.23) (1.63)
Minority * Targeters=3  10.54⇤  14.31⇤⇤⇤  2.37
(5.08) (3.45) (1.43)
Num. obs. 396 380 1368
R2 0.57 0.65 0.53
Adj. R2 0.56 0.64 0.53
L.R. 331.62 399.29 1032.50
⇤⇤⇤p< 0.001, ⇤⇤p< 0.01, ⇤p< 0.05. Robust s.e.s clustered by group/matching group.
Table 4: OLS regressions: individual contributions, supplementary treatments
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device when there were two or more lowest contributors. However, minority individuals did not
react differently to being targeted. In our additional treatments, minorities were targeted more
than majorities even when they were unique lowest contributors. They also reacted differently:
unlike majority group members, they did not increase their contributions after being targeted or
expropriated.
These mechanisms did not lead to significant unconditional differences in contributions be-
tween homogenous and heterogenous treatments, so it could be argued that the mechanisms above
are not having a strong impact. However, the high variance in contributions within treatments
may also make it hard to detect differences. Because expropriation must be coordinated, there
are multiple equilibria with different levels of contributions. Among heterogenous groups, those
which expropriated minorities more often saw lower contributions, suggesting that heterogeneity
may, but need not always, lead to lower efficiency. Overall, we were able to reproduce our mech-
anisms of interest even using a rather minimal group manipulation – different colour labels. This
supports our claim that under coordinated punishment institutions, small, seemingly irrelevant
differences can become salient.
4 Conclusion
Punishing free-riders need not always be costly. It can be too profitable. Existing theory concep-
tualizes social order as preventing individual free-riding, and downplays the simultaneous prob-
lem of controlling expropriation by majorities. The two problems are related in complex ways,
and this relationship suggests a new explanation for the inefficiency of heterogenous communi-
ties. Our cases show that different perceptions of episodes of “punishment” or “expropriation”
can spark conflict and free-riding. Our laboratory experiment imposed a minimal form of het-
erogeneity: different, randomly assigned, public color labels. Nevertheless, this was enough for
majority groups to use as a coordination device for expropriation. In some treatments, minorities
reacted to expropriation differently from majority group members, refusing to increase their con-
tributions. At the same time, there were fewer expropriations overall, and fewer expropriations of
a lowest contributor, in heterogenous groups, suggesting that heterogeneity can impair people’s
willingness and ability to punish free-riding.
In one sense, our argument’s policy implications are pessimistic. “Nation-building” is often
proposed as a solution to ethnic tensions (Miguel, 2004). However, if even minimal differences
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between groups can cause problems, nation-building must wholly erase these differences to suc-
ceed. This process is likely either to be slow, or, as in many cases of attempted nation-building,
to be experienced as highly oppressive by the groups involved. Similar remarks apply to “inte-
gration” policies for ethnic minorities in developed societies.
However, an alternative approach is available. If ethnic conflict and inefficiency are linked
to group differences in beliefs about punishment, a possible solution is to create institutions that
reduce ambiguity and legitimize the punishment of free-riders. In our experiment, minorities
only reacted differently to punishment when a history of previous expropriation, or an ambiguous
situation, made it hard to know the reason for being punished. In the main treatment where
contributions were common knowledge, they contributed more after being expropriated just as
majority group members did. In the real world, liberal institutions such as trials with due process
may reassure all groups that they are being treated fairly. Even when the state is not involved,
intergroup forumsmay defuse conflict by squashing rumors and misperceptions (Varshney, 2003).
Broadly speaking, institutional quality can help mitigate the problems of ethnic heterogeneity.14
A part of our argument which we could not test explicitly is that the willingness to punish
outgroup members may be affected by the risk of sparking counter-punishment and intergroup
conflict. In turn the lower ability to punish may lead to less intergroup trust and affect the network
of relationships linking different groups. Thus, the potential for ethnic conflict and inefficiency
in public good provision may be closely linked. These links could be explored in laboratory and
field settings.
14The cross-country regressions in Easterly (2001a) provide some support for this view.
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Appendix
Main PX History, rounds 11-20 Noise Stranger
Intercept  2.60⇤⇤⇤  3.08⇤⇤⇤  2.01⇤⇤⇤  2.90⇤⇤⇤
(0.36) (0.49) (0.39) (0.56)
Minority 2.28⇤⇤⇤ 3.89⇤⇤⇤ 2.69 2.35⇤⇤⇤
(0.55) (1.01) (1.79) (0.60)
Heterog.  1.07  0.70  1.60  0.12
(0.55) (1.06) (1.26) (0.69)
Unique lowest 2.94⇤⇤⇤ 1.53⇤⇤⇤ 0.86 2.47⇤⇤⇤
(0.43) (0.34) (0.49) (0.51)
Minority * unique lowest  2.72⇤⇤⇤  2.17  9.03⇤⇤⇤  1.63⇤⇤
(0.78) (1.12) (1.78) (0.56)
Heterog. * unique lowest 0.47 0.31 1.17 0.06
(0.65) (1.24) (1.31) (0.70)
Num. obs. 805 322 326 912
Pseudo R2 0.35 0.27 0.08 0.24
L.R. 230.83 52.21 16.08 168.25
⇤⇤⇤p< 0.001, ⇤⇤p< 0.01, ⇤p< 0.05. Robust s.e.s clustered by group (matching group for stranger treatments). Non-lowest contributors excluded.
Table 5: Logit regressions: logged odds of being expropriated, supplementary treatments
Table 5 shows logit regressions where the dependent variable is being expropriated. Non-
lowest contributors are excluded, since they were almost never expropriated. In PX treatments,
the coefficient on Minority is significant, but the summed coefficient Minority + Minority *
Unique lowest is not. Thus, minorities were only targeted more when they were one of two
or three equal lowest contributors in the group. In the additional treatments, summed coeffi-
cients Minority + Minority * Unique lowest are significantly positive in the history and stranger
treatments (p= 0.08; and p= 0.02 respectively), significantly negative in the noise treatment.
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